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Translating Xi Jinping’s speeches: 
China’s search for discursive power between ‘political correctness’ and ‘external propaganda’ 
Tanina Zappone 
 
 
Assuming that politics is inseparably concerned with language, the paper 
provides some insights on the translation strategies adopted in western 
languages editions of the collection Xi Jinping: The Governance of China (Xi Jinping 
tan zhiguo lizheng ödí¢M±), and on their potential impact in the 
perspective of China's external propaganda. 
The article collocates the editorial project in the perspective of China' 
discursive power strategy, as one of many current initiatives aimed to spread 
"China's voice" in the world. 
Since the volume apparently focuses on the construction of a heroic narrative 
around Xi Jinping's figure, the paper questions China's ability to adapt the 
Chinese leader's message for foreign rhetorical tastes and to build up a 
discourse able to attract and influence international public opinion. In 
particular, through an analysis of the translation process of the Italian edition 
of the book - where the author was involved as a translator - the paper tries to 
assess to what extent target-oriented strategies have influenced the choice of 
contents and translation in the book, as well as their effectiveness in terms of 
external propaganda.  
 
 
The release in 2014 of the collection of speeches, by China’s current leader Xi Jinping,  titled Xi Jinping 
tan zhiguo lizheng ödí¢M±, represented not only an editorial event, supported by huge 
government economic and ideological investments, but also a political issue, related to China’s 
capacity to enhance its outward representation. 
In fact the 500 - 600 pages foreign language versions of this compilation – titled in English Xi 
Jinping: The Governance of China and edited by the State Council Information Office of China, the CCCPC 
Party Literature Research Office and China International Publishing Group – can certainly be 
considered part of China's grand strategy to globally improve country's image abroad, since the book 
is explicitly targeted to “enhance the rest of the world’s understanding of the Chinese government’s 
philosophy and its domestic and foreign policies” and “to respond to rising international interest”. 1 
                                                             
 
1 Xi Jinping (2014: v). The word "interest" here is the translation of Chinese guanqie *0, literally “concern”. 
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This article tries to examine the effectiveness of this editorial project as a means to reach 
international public opinion and clarify China’s position in the world, taking full advantage of the 
author's experience as a translator for the Italian edition. 
The first part gives account of the promotional campaign of the book and its strategic 
implications. The second part summarizes the main contents of the collection, marking some notable 
differences with respect to previous political translation works and describes the main steps of the 
translating process, while the final section provides insights on the key translation strategies 
recently advocated by Chinese scholars and the ones specifically adopted in the book, pointing out 
elements of continuity and change. In the conclusion the author proposes a preliminary evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the translation project in terms of receptivity by western readers. 
 
1. The book in the perspective of discursive power: the promotional campaign and the “strong” 
leadership of Xi Jinping 
Since its release in September 2014,2 The Governance of China has soon become object of a strong 
promotional campaign, which has produced significant outcomes in a relatively short time. 
The volume was first launched during the Frankfort book fair in October 2014, and afterwards in 
London and New York Book fairs (April and May 2015). In the following months ceremonies and 
seminars have been held in France, Russia, Cambodia, Pakistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, the Czech 
Republic and elsewhere in order to present, review and comment the book.  
A wide range of initiatives promoted by the publisher – the Foreign Language Press – has soon 
guaranteed a large distribution of the product on the international book market. According to Lu 
Cairong, vice president of the China International Publishing Group, in spring 2015 over 4 million 
copies have already circulated worldwide, including one tenth overseas.3 Until March 2016, the book 
had sold more than 5.4 million copies, in more than 100 countries and regions, “setting a sales record 
at home and abroad for Chinese leaders' works since the reform and opening-up” (Gu Jianjun 2016).  
Dozens of translation projects blossomed around the world. They have been giving  support to 
the wide circulation of the volume. Nowadays the book is available in more than 15 languages, 
including “minor languages” such as Korean and Italian. 
                                                             
 
2 The volume was released in nine languages: Chinese, English, French, Russian, Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese, German and 
Japanese. 
3 Quoted in Callahan (2015). 
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A whole multilanguage website, under the government portal www.china.org, has been devoted 
to the promotion of the book. It provides detailed information about the book and gathers reviews, 
recommendations and news about the impact and distribution of the volume worldwide.4 
The effects of this promotional campaign have not been long in coming: in December 2014 the 
appearance of a copy of the book on the desk of Mark Zuckerberg during the visit of the then head of 
the Cyberspace Administration of China, Lu Wei, at the social networks’ California office, has not 
passed unnoticed, as well as the display of the book in international conferences (Callahan 2015). 
Beyond the official figures about book’s sales – which are allegedly influenced by the employ of 
the book as a learning resource in cadre study sessions – there is no doubt that the publication can 
boast some records in terms of contents, time and distribution. 
First of all, neither Jiang Zemin’s nor Hu Jintao’s speeches have undergone such kind of 
compilation. Secondly, The Governance of China has been the first collection of Chinese political texts 
ever available in digital version,5 and, what is more, no other large collection have appeared so soon, 
after the appointment of a Chinese leader.6  
How to explain these changes in China’s propaganda tradition on leaders’ works collections? 
The first answer to this questions comes directly from Chinese literature about the concept of 
“discursive power” (huayuquan éê). As Zhao Kejin argues, using this expression Chinese scholars 
refer to different kind of “power”: the “right to speak” in an international system dominated by the 
capitalist countries; the “power to speak” which is correlated to the enhancement of China’s national 
strength; the power of media, determined by the country’s capacity to control global media; the “soft 
power”, which depends on the ability to propagate the country’s culture and values; the diplomatic 
skills related to political operation and ideas contributions (Zhao Kejin 2016: 541-544). All these 
definitions converge in the consciousness – widely shared after China’s access to WTO in 2001 – that 
nowadays the country’s development capacities are crucially related not so much to its availability to 
                                                             
 
4 http://www.china.org.cn/china/node_7214554.htm 
5 It is available on Amazon website in kindle version from January 2015 in five languages, including French, Spanish and 
Portuguese; on Apple ibooks and iRead  from May 2015 in Chinese and English languages (Cheng Jinming and Zhao 
Dongsheng Ąþ -ï; 2016). 
6 Mao Zedong xuanji - diyi juan ¤ûĆ¿? (Mao Zedong Selected Works - first volume) were published in 1951, but 
contents regard the period 1925-1938; Deng Xiaoping wenxuan - di er juanü^dû ¿? (Deng Xiaoping Selected Works -
second volume) were released in 1983; Jiang Zemin wenxuan ¡¤û (Jiang Zemin Seleted works) in 2006. Hu Jintao Wenxuan Ð
ÿ¦û(Hu Jintao Selected Works) were published in September 2016, after almost four years from leadership turnover. The 
peculiarity of Xi Jinping’s case is made even more evident by the fact that, just a month after the release of Hu Jintao’s works, 
the popularity of the book has been clouded by the publication of a volume, containing a speech by President Xi Jinping 
himself about the study of works by his predecessor (Xinhua 2016). 
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continue to be a follower in the established political order, as to its ability to promote new models, in 
economic, social, cultural and political terms. 
Although “discursive power strategy has been the fundamental principle of the Communist 
Party of China since its establishment in 1921”, its significance in China’s eyes has become 
increasingly evident since the 21st century, when the country became the world’s second largest 
economy and gradually dismissed the policy of “hide one’s capabilities and bide one’s time” (taoguang 
yanghui ĉ'+) – adopted after the launch of the opening-up policy – in favor of the search of a 
“Beijing consensus” (Ramo 2004). In particular since Xi Jinping comes to power in 2012, discursive 
power acquires a strategic significance in governance and foreign policy. The new leader’s behavior 
marks a sharp distinction with his predecessors: he definitely gives up the previous low profile 
attitude in foreign affairs, and points to clearer targets. In 2014, during a study session of the CCCPC 
Politburo, Xi Jinping states: “To enhance country’s cultural soft power, it is necessary to enhance 
international discursive power, strengthen international communication capabilities, accurately 
build up an external discursive system” (tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili, yao nuli tigao guoji huayuquan, 
yao jiaqiang guoji chuanbo nengli jianshe, jingxin goujian duiwai huayu tixi ĎMY:òW4Ú94
ĎMăéêÚ7kMăÑ4fãÁnf[Qéê Â [...]; Xi Jinping öd 
2014). 
Even still sticking to the principle of “peaceful development”, Xi adopts a stronger position 
towards international community, placing China at the center of many multilateral initiatives7 and 
highlighting domestic core interests in international disputes.8  
The publication of The Governance of China is a gem perfectly encrusted in these new path aimed 
to spread “China’s voice” and promote China’s soft power resources. It is a part of a discursive power 
strategy, which involves many tools within different fields – from media and cyber affairs to 
economic and financial sectors, from cultural and educational initiatives to political and diplomatic 
practices – and which obviously entails a narrow focus on the figure of the President.  
The factors which bring a country to the adoption of an authoritarian leadership are very 
complex. They include economic, political, social and cultural aspects, issues of governability and 
political legitimacy, whose assessment would go beyond the scope of this article. However, what is 
                                                             
 
7 According to analysts, RPC annual budget on external propaganda in the year 2014 was around 10 thousand billion dollars. 
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, The Silk Road Economic Belt, and the Maritime Silk 
Road are some the main initiatives, which RPC has been leading in Eastern Asian region and beyond (Shambaugh 2015).  
8 See, for instance, the disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu islands or to the establishment of an air defense identification 
zone over the East China Sea. 
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notable here is that, the focus on Xi Jinping’s personality – who recently brought to define him as a 
“core leader” – is perfectly consistent with China’s grand strategy on discursive power (Buckley 
2016).9 From a communication perspective, in fact, Xi Jinping represents the main voice in the 
outward chorus of China’s voices: he is the one who should be heard louder and clearer in the 
orchestra of international politics, the one who must deliver the most incisive and direct message, to 
attract foreign audience’s attention. The feeble voices of previous “collective leadership” (jiti lingdao 
Ć Č\) have already proved to have scarce impact and to be hardly listened in the global fora.10 
This partially explains the choice to put the President at the center of a huge multimedia 
campaign, which encloses his charming wife and resorts to traditional and innovative channels, such 
as music video, cartoon video, android apps etc. (Hernandez 2016). 
This celebration of Xi’s individual power and charm has spread concerns about the likely return 
to a personality cult. Actually many initiatives around the leader’s figure recall the style of traditional 
propaganda and, at first glance, The Governance of China falls into this category. The book’s cover 
reveals an evident continuity with the past: a portrait of the leader in a rounded frame stands out 
from a beige background, above a red letter title, which reminds Maoist publications. Moreover, 
browsing through the book, the reader’s attention is easily drawn by three inserts, including 45 
photographs of Xi. These photos portray the leader as a “man of the people”, who personally 
underwent national suffering and who embodies traditional Confucian values in family and 
community. They show a magnanimous and tolerant leader, who supports his people in time of 
suffering and in everyday life; a wise representative of his country abroad, able to be friendly with 
foreign media in informal contexts and to command respect by foreign leaders in formal occasions. 
                                                             
 
9 In October 2016, a communique, released after a four-day meeting of senior Communist Party officials in Beijing, for the 
first time referred to Xi Jinping as “the core leader”. The term goes back to late Eighties and was coined by Deng Xiaoping to 
try to strengthen the just-elected general secretary, Jiang Zemin, after Zhao Ziyang’s deposition. Before Xi, it has been given 
only to paramount leaders: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Xi’s immediate predecessor, Hu Jintao, who has 
been a less assertive leader, never got or even sought for the title. Hence the return to the expression “core leader” has been  
interpreted as a significant strengthening of Xi’s position and as a mark of his special stature, compared to the previous 
generation of leader. 
10 The formula “collective leadership” is generally linked to Deng Xiaoping’s theory and practice of government, and has 
originally represented a response to Maoist authoritarian and individual leadership. By emphasizing the role and functions 
of the Politburo Standing Committee and promoting a system of internal division of responsibilities, Deng tried to prevent 
those past political mistakes, which had been caused by the arbitrary decision-making of a single top leader and had 
jeopardized the country’s stability. This system, which makes the top leader a “primus inter pares”, has been prevailing 
during all Hu Jintao’s era, but today – according to many analysts – it could be relinquished, due to the return of a 
“strongman” like Xi Jinping, who has re-centralized in his figure many political functions and has overcome constitutional 
limits (the term limit to presidential mandates, established by the PRC Constitution, has been abolished in 2018, before Xi’s 
second term; Cheng Li 2016). 
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An appendix, edited by the publisher, further strengthens this heroic narrative around Xi 
Jinping, giving more details on his private life, and so contributing to the picture of a strong, hard 
working, cultured and decisive leader who has a great “affection for the common people” (Xi 
Jinping 2014: 481) and embodies the realization of China's dream (Callahan 2015). 
Is the search for discursive power leading China back to old-style propaganda and 
personality cult? Or are the efforts to improve the country’s image contributing to a new set of 
discursive rules in external propaganda? 
The following sections propose some preliminary considerations on the issue, in the 
perspective of the practice of political translation. Assuming that politics is inseparably 
concerned with language, and that discourse studies could bring new dimension to the 
comprehension of politics (Chilton and Schäffner 2002), the paper provides some insights on 
the translation strategies adopted for Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, and on their potential impact on 
the success of the book among foreign readers. 
 
2. Translation project: contents and process 
In the last three decades, “the translation of ‘China’s voice’ has played a vital part in communicating 
the messages of China to the world, and has become part of the discursive endeavour to construct 
positive Chinese representations abroad” (Li Jingjing and Li Saihong 2015). Translation is not only a 
literary or technical activity: “Although the translation is often invisible in the field of politics, it is 
actually an integral part of political activity” (Schaffner and Bassnett 2010: 13). The first “political 
decision” made in the translation process is which texts get translated, from and into which 
languages. 
The Governance of China is composed of 79 pieces – delivered from November 2012 to June 2014 – 
including speeches, talks, interviews, instructions, and correspondence, arranged in 18 chapters, and 
covering a wide range of topics relating to Chinese governance, from domestic development policies 
to national defense, ecology, and the campaign against corruption within the Party. Five sections are 
wholly devoted to the main principles and policies, guiding China’s growing involvement in world 
affairs. 11 
While the order of the pieces in each chapter is merely chronological, the sequence of chapters 
evidently aims to build a national narrative: the first chapter, on socialism with Chinese 
                                                             
 
11 They are Peaceful Development, New Model of Major-country Relations, Neighborhood Diplomacy, Cooperation 
with Developing Countries, Multilateral Relations. Refers to Swaine 2015 for a detailed analysis. 
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characteristics, affirms the fundamental political theory, which drives the country’s development; 
the second, on the “Chinese dream” (Zhongguomeng M), announces the goal of national pride and 
personal fulfillment, celebrated in the first slogan ever announced by Xi Jinping; the following 
chapters deal with economic reform and development, “for economic growth is the driver of the 
rejuvenation of Chinese nation”, while rule of law, social undertaking, advanced culture, innovation 
capacity, ecological progress and national defense are the preconditions to a successful, unique and 
sustainable model of development (Xue Zhong 2016: 135). The chapters from XI to XV cover foreign 
affairs in the perspective of diplomacy and international cooperation, for globalization is the scenario 
in which China has been realizing its identity as a cooperative, stable, economically powerful and 
politically influential country. The book ends with three sections on the Party: the first treats the 
relationship between CPC and the masses, the second emphasizes the significance of the struggle 
against corruption within the Party, while the last one – entitled “The CPC leadership” (“Innalzare il 
livello della leadership del Partito”, in Italian) – asserts the continuing ruling status of a party which 
strive to enhance and legitimize its power. 
A diachronic analysis, comparing these topics to those in the Selected Work of previous leaders, 
gives some hints about the strategic goals of the book.12 First of all, as Figure 1 shows, the number of 
pieces referring to narrowly political or defence-related themes has been steadily shrinking from 
Mao Zedong to Jiang Zemin’s era, in favor of topics concerning economic development and reform, 
science and innovation and diplomatic relations. These changes can be considered as a natural 
consequence of the gradually opening up of China to the outside world and to the launch of economic 
reforms from Deng Xiaoping’s government onwards. What is remarkable is that in The Governance of 
China the amount of articles associated to economic issues decreases for the first time, while 
diplomacy and foreign affairs become the most common themes in the book, along with politics. 
Moreover the figure reveals a trend to focus reader’s attention on topics such as science, innovation 
and education, which have found little consideration in previous political works. Despite the 
methodological limits of this survey – which compares collections conceptually similar, but 
quantitatively and qualitatively dissimilar –13 the data seem to confirm that the core objective of  Xi 
                                                             
 
12 Figures have been elaborated on the basis of a comparative analysis of the official documents published in the Selected 
Works of Mao Zedong (Volumes 1 to 5. 1977. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press), the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volumes 1 to 
3. 1994. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press), and the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (Volumes 1 and 2. 2012. Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press). 
The choice of volumes is motivated not only by their significance in the history of  Chinese political translation, but also by 
their relevance in the elaboration of the policy making of individual leaders. 
13 Mao’s works count 229 article, Deng Xiaoping’s 208, Jiang Zemin’s 140. 
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Jinping’s work is “to declare China’s commitment to peaceful development and demonstrates China’s 
image as a responsible major country” (Cai Mingzhao 2014).  
 
Figure 1: Topics in collections of works by Chinese leaders 
 
 
The translation of the chapters of The Governance of China has been a collective work, which – as  
always happens in China for the translation of political documents – has followed a set of highly 
regulated procedures.14 Previous studies tell us that, since the translation of Mao Zedong's Selected 
Works, the procedure – basically secretive, due to the “closed” nature of China’s political system – 
includes at least three steps: preliminary translation, proofreading and finalising (Li Jingjing and Li 
Saihong 2015). Foreign experts are always invited to discuss the translation drafts to ensure that the 
target text not only faithfully conveys the original meaning, but also is idiomatic and can be well 
received by the target audience (Cheng Zhenqiu ½Ā° 2002: 195). 
In the case of the Italian edition of The Governance of China the process has been even longer and 
has implied four stages: rough translation by native Italian translators, first proofreading, second 
proofreading and finalising. The first proofreading has involved the foreign editor and native 
translators and has aimed to improve the Italian text. The second proofreading has involved also 
Chinese translators and the Italian editor; it has meant to reconnect the text to its original nature in 
terms of meaning and style; in the finalising stage senior Chinese translators have revised and 
                                                             
 
14 In China the translation of political texts usually involves two specialized governmental bodies: the Central Compilation 
and Translation Bureau and the Department of Translation and Interpretation. The former is under the control of the CPC 
Central Committee and translate Party documents and government reports, the latter is affiliated with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and translates State leader’s speeches. 
Mao$Zedong
Deng$Xiaoping
Jiang$Zemin
Xi$Jinping Politics
Diplomacy
Economics
Science
Defense
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approved the final version; little space has been left to the foreign editor’s advices, while Italian 
translators were not involved.  
In this fully institutionalised process, the work of Chinese translators mostly seemed to follow 
principles of accuracy and faithfulness, which are traditionally considered governing norms in 
Chinese political translation (Cheng Zhenqiu ½Ā° 2002, Guo Jiading õYď 2002, Xu Yanan m³ 
2000, Zhang Yuanyuan jø 2004 et al.). After all, the majority of the professional Chinese 
translators are members of the CPC, and hold senior official positions in political and professional 
institutions;15 they are mandated to work for the interest of the Party and, besides an excellent 
foreign language education,16 they have received a political education, who brings them to follow a 
code of conduct, according to which the practice of political translation is “an officially sanctioned 
project of exporting literature and ideology since 1950” (Ma Shikui 2006: 17). What really influences 
the translation work, therefore, is not so much the original contribution of individual translators, but 
rather the programmed objectives  – decided by top-level authorities  – of the specific project, as well 
as the translation strategies adopted to pursue these objectives. Most of the times the ability of 
translators is confined to apply these strategies, by bending language to the needs of  slogans and 
producing texts which sound often questionable on a formal level and empty on the substantial level. 
In this regard, the following section examines the main positions recently taken by Chinese 
senior scholars and translators on political translation by shortly reviewing the relevant literature on 
the issue, with the aim of assessing their application to the case of The Governance of China. 
 
3. The impact of the target-oriented strategies on The Governance of China  
As Paolo Magagnin observes “[I]n scholarship focusing on China, whereas classical rhetoric has 
received extensive attention, the analysis of modern and contemporary political language and 
discourse is a comparatively recent field of research” (Magagnin 2016: 346). Only in the last years the 
interest of Chinese scholars on political language and its translation has been growing as a 
consequence of China’s increasing integration into the global community. The number of studies 
devoted to the analysis and identification of effective and appropriate translation strategies has been 
                                                             
 
15 For instance, the senior translator, Huang Youyi, who worked on the English edition of The Governance of China is Standing 
Vice Chairman and Secretary General of the Translators Association of China, and a member of the National Committee of 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Areddy 2015).  
16 Take the example of Ding Hengqi, who translated Hu Jintao's speeches, and has been a professor and dean in the 
University of International Business and Economics, and a Chinese Consul General to San Francisco (Yong Zhong 2011: 801). 
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steadily increasing, also in the light of a broader knowledge of western translation theories, such as 
Toury’s descriptive translation studies and Nida’s functional equivalence theory.  
Nowadays China’s official discourse better understands the “intricacy and ideological 
implications involved in the practice of translating political discourse” (Li Jingjing and Li Saihong 
2015: 425). As a result, the traditional prescriptive view that political translation in China is a source 
oriented practice, totally dominated by the prominent requirement of “political correctness”, has 
begun to be questioned. 
Through the years translation strategies have undergone a deep evolution, moving from the 
literal purpose-driven translation of Mao’s works  – where formal equivalence prevails and most of 
the cultural elements were explained with footnotes – to the more idiomatic target/reader 
translations of today, which are mostly culturally oriented and based on the principle of dynamic 
equivalence.  
Although “fidelity” is still considered the basic requirement of political translation, nowadays 
Chinese scholars maintain that the goal of political translation is “[O]n the one hand to ensure 
accuracy of the information and ideological correctness; on the other hand, (it is necessary) to ensure 
the effectiveness of cross-cultural communication” (yi fangmian yao baozheng xinxi de zhunquexing yu 
yishi xingtai de zhengquexing; ling yi fangiam, bixu baozheng kuawenhua chuanbo de xiaoguo ćÚ#ä
$wµ-¹uzålsµ¹uEćoĊ#äñ:µ) (Xiong Zheng ª 
2015:77). The translators’ work is thus considered not just as the act of faithfully transferring of a 
political message into the target language, but as the task of producing texts able to fit cultural and 
linguistic conventions and expectation of the target community. To achieve “the desired function of 
translation in external propaganda” (duiwai xuanchuan fanyi de yuqi gongneng [QXÊçµċ6
Ñ) a text should be able, first of all, to draw the readers’ attention (Yuan Zhuoxi Ø=J 2013). Yuan 
Zhuoxi individuates the main factors which may influence the reception of a message among foreign 
public in: the “sense of identification” (rentong gan àG{); the “respect of the target-language’s 
rhetoric conventions” (xiuci xiguan %ôy) and of “rhetorical sensitivity” (xiuci ganshou %ô{B) 
(Ibidem). 
During a lecture given at a translation forum organized in September 2016 by the Translators 
Association of China (Zhongguo fanyi xiehui MÊç<), Xu Mingjiang, who is a former chief editor 
at the Foreign Language Press and joined the translation of The Governance of China as a senior 
translator, pointed out that the key word in translation work should be “simplicity”. According to Xu, 
who quotes Joseph Devlin, the number of words used in translation should not exceed 2000 units, and 
translator must:  
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strive to use simple words, easy to understand and familiar to the readers, avoid less 
common words, words “with Chinese characteristics”, and also words too deeply 
correlated to Chinese context. [...] Pay attention to the different characteristics of the 
two languages, less use adjectives and adverbs, be proficient in using verbs. [...] In short, 
the language of the translation must be the simplest, plainest possible. 
 
`ý²À>|µæ²ìÌ«xµæ_²cÛµæ_²~Åcëµ
M¬Óµæ÷Ú_²MÏS§µæ [...]£z¼êßµG¬©_²l
Zæ3æ²T8æ[...]vçÚ`RµFÑ²À>Wµêß
(He Shan 2016) 
 
On the same line, another senior translator of Xi’s works, Huang Youyi, on the sidelines of a 
conference in Shanghai in April 2015, states that  while in the past the readers of Chinese translators 
were only professors, scholars and China watchers, “nowadays we are trying to reach 5.7 billion 
foreigners out there who have some kind of interest in China. They are not China experts. We should 
make our translated word more targeted toward their reading habits, their level of understanding 
China”. Huang goes even further describing the translator as a bold innovator, who should aim to 
change some of the old-fashioned Chinese way of speaking, through his work. 17 
Chinese translation experts are fully aware that transition from Chinese to foreign language “is 
not only a change from one language to another, but also a transition of two different cultures and 
values” as well as that neglecting cultural differences and reader’s response could lead to cultural 
misunderstandings, conflicts and even strengthen stereotypes and mutual distrust (Liu Daoying 2015: 
18). 
But did Chinese translators put their linguistics and communication knowledge to good use for 
the translation of The Governance of China?  
A look at the English translation of the book title gives a preliminary answer to this question. 
The original title Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng has undergone a deep adaptation in foreign languages. In 
fact a literal translation would have been Xi Jinping talks of (tan í) governance (zhiguo ¢M) and 
administration (lizheng ± ). The words tan and lizheng have been omitted, and the resulting shorter 
title has allowed to put the name of the leader in the foreground. This choice – as Xu Mingjiang 
                                                             
 
17 Huang takes the example of the world “comrade”, which still appears in Chinese political discourse, and that can be find 
somewhere in The Governance of Chinese. It has been always translated into “friends” and – in Huang’s expectations – “[I]n 
the future, probably you will see less words like that” (Areddy 2015). 
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reveals – meant to respond to the marketing notion of the First Moment of Truth,18 according to 
which a customer/user makes the decision to purchase a product in the first few seconds after he 
encounters that product for the first time on the shelf (He Shan !¯ 2016). In this case, therefore, 
translators not only have accurately employed translation techniques (reduction/adaptation), but 
have also taken in due account aspects of marketing strategy.   
For the book title, the choice made for the English translation was maintained also in French and 
Italian editions - respectively Xi Jinping: La Gouvernance de la Chine and Xi Jinping: Governare la Cina - 
however this was not always the case. If we look at the chapters’ titles, for instance, the techniques of 
reduction and adaptation used in the English version have not been adopted in the Italian edition, 
which prefers a more literal translation. Here below an example from the title of chapter I: 
 
CH:           Jǐn jǐn wéirào jiānchí hé fāzhǎn Zhōngguó tèsè shèhuì zhǔyì  
  ÃÃLÇOIAaM¬Óº  
EN: Socialism with Chinese Characteristic 
IT:  Perseverare nel socialismo con caratteristiche cinesi e nel suo sviluppo 
 
In general the English edition deviates more from the redundant and repetitive style of the original, 
and apparently strives to apply the aforementioned translation strategies, while the Italian edition is 
much more faithful to the original.19 That could be a result of preliminary evaluations made by the 
Foreign Language Press about different readership: on the one hand the much broader and various 
world of English-reading public; on the other hand the Italian readers, far less numerous and mostly 
composed by scholars and China’s experts. Nonetheless the Italian edition does not give up attracting 
common readers: the announcement of book’s release first appeared online under the title 
“Governare la Cina. Scritti e discorsi del presidente cinese (2012-2014)” (the Governance of China. 
Writings and speeches of the Chinese President), a title which evidently tries to attract the attention 
of non-experts, who could not know the proper name of the Chinese President. Moreover during the 
whole translation process, Italian native translators were recommended to adopt a plain style, in 
order to be understood and reach common people. 
                                                             
 
18 The term “Moment of Truth” (MOT) or “First Moment of Truth” (commonly FMOT) was coined by Procter & Gamble in 
2005 to define the first interaction between a shopper and a product on a store’s shelf. 
19 A telling example comes from the maintenance in the Italian version of long classical quotations, which have been almost 
always omitted in the English edition. An excerpt from the Classic of Songs (Shijing), quoted in a speech held in 2014, does not 
appear in the English version, albeit it has been wholly translated in Italian (Xi Jinping 2016: 158). 
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The “indigenous concepts” (benyuan gainian ¨ r) – namely those linguistic signs which are 
historically, culturally and socially connoted to a shared repertoire of a specific linguistic community 
– represent, without doubts, the hardest challenge of translation (He Yuajian !&f  2010). 
Neologisms (xin ci æ), political technical terms (zhengzhi shuyu ¢ê), quotation of verses 
(shiju yinyu èD i ê), four characters expressions (sizi jiegouKU Æ), sayings and proverbs 
(yanyu îê) are notably present in The Governance of China, since Xi Jinping often resorts to classical 
quotations and cultural references, as sources of internal consensus and international prestige 
(Scarpari 2015). Different procedures have been adopted to translate them, ranging from 
adaptation/equivalence, omission and explanation to amplification, division and transformation of 
parts of speech. Thus the saying: ÒÖÔC1´qßúÍ1×Liáng yào kǔ kǒu lìyú bìng, 
zhōngyán nì ěr lìyú xíng. (literally “Good medicines are bitter to the tongue but beneficial to the 
disease, the good tips are hard to the ears but of benefit to a (good) behavior”) has been translated in 
Italian with the equivalent proverb “Il medico pietoso fa la piaga purulenta”.20 Words politically 
sensitive, such as xuanchuanX (propaganda), tongzhimenGp (comrade), or ambiguous, like 
jingshen Á» (spirit), has been adapted – “comunicazione” (publicity), “amici” (friends), “principio 
guida” (guiding principle) – to avoid cultural misunderstandings. When possible, Chinese idiomatic 
expression have been omitted, to simplify and clarify the text. 
But to what extent has the final translation beneficiated of these strategies of adaptation? Did it 
succeed in drawing readers interest and meeting their taste and sensibilities?  
According to a survey conducted by Luo Yiling, Zhang Li and Ge Lingling on the English edition 
of the book, although translators made good use of procedures such as liberal translation (57,22%), 
reduction/omission (4,15%), equivalence (2,075%) or hybrid translation (24,9%), the majority of the 
indigenous concepts have been literally translated (177,67%) (Luo Yiling, Zhang Li and Ge Lingling 
2016 – figure 2), so that target-oriented strategies – even if present – have had little impact on the 
overall work. 
Apparently, political responsibility keeps being the priority of the translator, and only when the 
text is lacking political connotation a translation oriented to the target language is really admitted. 
The norm of adequacy prevails on that of acceptability, the translation fails to find a balanced point 
between the two poles. It produces a redundant and repetitive discourse, where obsolete expressions 
abound, and which sounds very far from common language. As a translator of the Italian edition, I 
witnessed how rarely the Chinese professionals, who have proofread the text, have been ready to 
                                                             
 
20 Xi Jinping (2016: 231). 
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accept objections by the Italian part to their corrections, although by so doing they have heavily 
reduced the readability of the book.  
 
Figure 2: Translation techniques of indigenous concepts in The Governance of China 
 
 
After all – as Yong Zhong argues in his critical analysis of the official translations of Hu Jintao’s 
works – in the Chinese context a “correct translation”: 
a.! is structurally loaded with complex syntactic structures and difficult vocabularies including 
especially pedantic words and phrases; 
b.! duplicates the original rhetorical features (e.g., symmetry, contrast, idiom and euphemisms) 
of the Chinese ST; 
c.! covers up or dresses up those elements of the ST not intended for international readers; 
d.! must have the quality required for enhancing the charismas of authors; and 
e.! often looks maximalist and bulky as a result of having to achieve the above. (Yong Zhong 
2011) 
 
Even if, at the micro level, Chinese official translation adopts textual devices to meet readership 
expectations, however, at the macro level, political translation continues to be an institutionalized 
norm-governed practice. The governance of China succeeded in maintaining ideological correctness, 
but fails in achieving its external propaganda goal of “reassuring the world that China will continue 
to develop and that its rise will benefit everyone” (Swaine 2016). It has constructed a narrative too far 
from that to which the readers of liberal countries are accustomed. 
 
Literal$translation
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Hybrid$
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4. Conclusions 
This paper has tried to examine the communicative effectiveness of the translation project The 
Governance of China, in the framework of China’s search for discursive power. Specifically, the article 
has attempted to analyze to what extend the project challenges previous approach to political 
translation to increase the book’s receptivity by foreign readers and hits the goal of enhancing “the 
rest of the world’s understanding of the Chinese government’s philosophy and its domestic and 
foreign policies”. 
After having detected some notable novelties in terms of time of publication (soon after the 
appointment of Xi), channels of distribution (digital versions available on Amazon and Apple ibooks 
and iRead) and  selected contents (compared to previous leaders’ collections, the amount of speeches 
associated to economic issues decreases, diplomacy and foreign affairs become the most common 
themes along with politics, while science, innovation and education find more consideration), the 
paper focused on the translating process, with special reference to the Italian language edition, for 
which the paper’s author has been one of the translators. By witnessing that the whole project has 
been realized as a collective work, leaving very little space for individual initiative, we argued that 
the final text is the outcome of a “pyramidally based” process on guidelines and strategies, settled by 
the government for political purposes. The analysis of some examples from the English, French and 
Italian editions showed that, although somehow the translation beneficiates of target-oriented 
strategies of adaptation such as liberal translation, reduction/omission, equivalence or hybrid 
translation, all strongly advocated by Chinese academic literature on political translation – this is 
especially true in the English version and for indigenous concepts – literal translation still prevails, 
therefore undermining the effectiveness of the translation project in terms of receptivity by western 
readers. 
The translation of The Governance of China fully reflects the persistence of the old contradiction 
between political correctness and external propaganda in Chinese political text.  
This study to some extent raises awareness for China, who is eager to spread its voice in the 
world and promote the country’s soft power resources, but it is still far away from making PRC 
external propaganda attractive to foreign public. China’s current aspirations to expand its discursive 
power, by projecting in the global discourse a positive image of its leader and of its national 
discourse, are still facing the contradiction of a leadership who is available to defy the political 
language of the past, but not to the point of questioning the existing political system.  
In 2015 Xi clearly stated that the future competition in comprehensive strength among nations 
will definitely be determined by country’s system ability to innovate, but the path to effectively 
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innovating China political communication and to making PRC external propaganda attractive to 
foreign public seems to be still a very long one. 
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